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I. INTRODUCTION

For over a century, employment at-will has been the law in
almost all American jurisdictions.' As a result, employers can fire
their employees, and employees can quit, with or without reason. 2 In
addition, employers have the authority under the at-will rule to
regulate all terms and conditions of employment.3 During the past
two decades a series of judicial exceptions to the at-will rule that
prohibit termination of an employee for a variety of reasons have
eroded the at-will doctrine. 4 These exceptions fall into two categories.
First, an employer may not terminate an employee for reasons that
violate public policy5 Second, an employer may not terminate an
employee Who received an explicit or implied promise that termination
6
would only occur for good cause.
Until recently, judicial exceptions to the at-will doctrine were
limited to actions for wrongful discharge. The terms and conditions of
employment, such as demotion, 7 reprimand, fringe benefits,
promotion, or any other employer action short of termination, remained subject to the employer's complete discretion under the at-will

1.
See Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the
Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 719, 719-27 (1991) (describing
the history of the employment at-will doctrine).
2.
Id. at 720.
3.
See id. at 720-21 (noting that, traditionally, an employment agreement fixing only the
method of compensation did not regulate the duration of employment).
4.
Statutory exceptions have also eroded the at-will doctrine. These exceptions include
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1994); the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1994 & Supp.); and the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1994 & Supp.). These
statutory exceptions, however, are not within the scope of this Note.
5.
See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322 (1981) (stating that an
employee may not be discharged when the dismissal "violates fundamental principles of public

policy").
6.
See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 384-88 (1988) (stating
that an agreement that termination would be based only on good cause creates an exception to
the general rule of employment at-will).
7.
"Terms and conditions of employment' refers to the phase of the employment relationship between hiring and termination. Federal statutory laws do not permit an employer "to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual:' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). This provision includes terms and
conditions of employment, such as a failure to promote to partner. Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U.S. 69, 74-75 (1984).
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doctrine. In Scott v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company,8 however, the
California Supreme Court recognized two employees' wrongful demotion claim. This recognition of wrongful demotion indicates a willingness by one of the country's leading employment jurisdictions to expand the implied contract exception beyond wrongful discharge.
Moreover, since demotion is just one aspect of the terms and
conditions of employment, a recognition of wrongful demotion
indicates that the implied contract exception is applicable to all the
terms and conditions of employment. The implied contract may now
govern all phases of the employment relationship. This approach is a
radical expansion of settled law and has the potential to reshape
American employment law by relegating the at-will doctrine to those
few and unimportant portions of unemployment law not subject to an
implied contract.
In Part II, this Note will examine the impact of the Scott decision on the employment at-will doctrine by providing a brief background of the events leading to the Scott decision, an overview of the
Scott decision and its reasoning, and the position of jurisdictions other
than California. This Note will then demonstrate, in Part III, that
recognition of wrongful demotion creates a cause of action
encompassing almost all terms and conditions of employment.
Wrongful demotion will cover almost all terms and conditions of
employment because wrongful demotion has no intrinsic doctrinal
limitations and extrinsic limitations prove to be inadequate or
unsupported by policy. Part IV will consider the policies underlying
wrongful demotion and analyze possible employer responses to its
recognition. Finally, Part V will conclude that recognizing wrongful
demotion reduces an employer's at-will discretion to the point at which
the at-will doctrine is completely circumscribed by an implied contract
straitjacket that relegates the at-will rule to regulation of the most
minor terms and conditions of employment.

8.

11 Cal. 4th 454, 904 P.2d 834, 845-46 (1995).
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II. THE ORIGINS OF WRONGFUL DEMOTION

A. Employment At-Will
Employment at-will is generally recognized as the child of
Horace Wood, a commentator on American law in the late nineteenth
century.9 In 1877, Wood wrote that "a general or indefinite hiring is
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out to
be a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof."10
Wood cited four cases in support of this proposition, but none of the
cases truly supported the at-will rule." A variety of other commentators and courts, however, eventually adopted the doctrine, 12 and by the
early twentieth century, the Supreme Court provided constitutional
protection for the rule.'3
In 1959, the first crack appeared in the at-will doctrine when
California recognized a public policy exception in Peterman v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, Local 396.14 Over a decade later, other courts
began to follow California's lead in recognizing exceptions to the atwill rule, 15 and by the mid-1980s, the at-will doctrine had suffered

9.
Peck, 66 Wash. L. Rev. at 722 (cited in note 1) (noting that Wood's definitive treatise,
which set forth the at-will rule, has been criticized by scholars, in part because the cases used by
Wood to develop the at-will rule did not support this proposition).
10. Horace G. Wood, A Treatise on the Law of Master & Servant § 134 at 272 (John D.
Parsons, Jr., 1877).
11. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880,
886-87 (1980) (analyzing the four major cases cited by Wood in his treatise and concluding that
they do not stand for an employment at-will rule). See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Employer
Discipline: U.S. Report, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 428, 432-33 (1964) (discussing the judicial shift away
from Wood's view as a result of changed circumstances and the policy decision to free capital for
the expansion of industry).
12. Peck, 66 Wash. L. Rev. at 722-23 (cited in note 1).
13. See Coppage v. Kansas,236 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1915) (holding that a state government could
not, consistent with due process, prohibit an employer from only hiring employees who agree not
to join a union), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313
U.S. 177, 177 (1941); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) (concluding that the
federal government could not, consistent with due process, compel an employer to employ any
person against the will of the employer), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 177. See
also Peter S. Partee, Note, Reversing the Presumptionof Employment At Will, 44 Vand. L. Rev.
689, 689 (1991) (noting the prominence of the at-will doctrine throughout most of the twentieth
century).
14. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959).
15. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549, 551-52 (1974) (recognizing
a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine); Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 891-92 (recognizing an
implied contract exception to the at-will doctrine).
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substantial erosion. 16 For example, in a state recognizing a public
policy exception to the at-will rule, an employer may not terminate an
employee for refusing to perform an illegal act, such as indecent
exposure. 17
Other common public policy exceptions prohibit
termination for exercising a statutory right, 8 performing a statutory
2°
obligation, 9 or reporting an employer's statutory violation.
In addition to the generally recognized public policy exception,
most jurisdictions also prohibit termination without cause when the
2
employer has agreed to terminate employees only for good cause. '
While good cause agreements may be express or implied, most are implied from the employer's oral assurances, past practices, and employment policies.2 2 An ever-widening source for implied contracts is
employee handbooks, 23 which typically outline grounds for discipline
and discharge, describe procedures for determining if discharge or
16. See Partee, 44 Vand. L. Rev. at 690 (cited in note 13) (discussing state judicial exceptions to the at-will doctrine). For articles criticizing the at-will doctrine, see Lawrence E. Blades,
Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1410-13 (1967) (discussing the inadequacy of existing limits upon
the rights of employers to discharge their employees); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom
Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 1, 4-8 (1979) (outlining an
employee's need for further job protection); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against
Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev. 481, 482-91 (1976) (discussing employees'
need to be free from unjust or oppressive discipline by employers). For articles supporting the atwill rule, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947, 95079 (1984) (stating that parties should be free to adopt employment at-will if they desire and that
employment at-will should be used to "fill in the gaps" of employment contracts); Andrew P.
Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire the Wrongful DischargeLaw,
74 Tex. L. Rev. 1901, 1905-33 (1996) (rebutting common criticisms of the employment at-will

doctrine).
17.
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025, 1035-36
(1985).
18. See Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973)
(concluding that retaliatory discharge in response to the filing of a workers' compensation claim
is wrongful); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 589-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(concluding that the discharge of an employee for refusing to violate a provision of the Clean Air
Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, 392 (1960), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.
(1994), was wrongful).
19. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512, 515-16 (1975) (holding that an employee
cannot be discharged for performing jury duty).
20. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A-2d 385, 386-88 (1980)
(discussing the discharge of an employee who attempted to ensure that his employer complied
with Connecticut food and drug laws).
21. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627-30 (Minn. 1983) (concluding
that employment contracts with an indefinite duration do not preclude employers from agreeing
to be bound by additional job security provisions contained in employee handbooks).
22. See notes 44-55 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have implied such
agreements).
23. See note 105 and accompanying text (citing cases examining the effect of employee

handbooks).
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discipline is warranted, and outline other policy statements regarding
the terms and conditions of the employment relationship. An implied
contract arising from an employee handbook and the implied contract
exception to the at-will doctrine provided the foundation for
24
California's decision in Scott v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
B. California'sRecognition of Wrongful Demotion
The plaintiffs in Scott, C. Byron Scott and Al Johnson, were
two employees of Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E").25 Scott
and Johnson were senior managers at PG&E and had been employed
for twenty-four and twenty years respectively.6 The two men also
operated an outside consulting firm called S&J Engineering
Corporation.27 PG&E was not only aware of the outside business but
28
had, in fact, encouraged its employees to operate such businesses.
Scott and Johnson contended that their intervention into an
investigation by PG&E's internal auditing department earned them
the enmity of the auditing personnel and led to an investigation of
their outside business. 29
Following the investigation, PG&E
suspended Scott and Johnson because of a conflict of interest between
S&J Engineering and PG&E.3
PG&E provided Scott and Johnson with a chance to respond to
the allegations against them.3 1 Although their response refuted
PG&E's allegations, PG&E demoted Scott and Johnson to positions
they had held fourteen and sixteen years earlier, relieved them of all
supervisory duties, and cut their salaries and benefits by twenty-five
percent. 32 Following these disciplinary actions, Scott and Johnson
sued, alleging that PG&E had breached an implied contract outlined
in the company's personnel policies manual. 33 The manual included a
system of "positive discipline" that imposed a series of escalating
penalties in response to employee misbehavior.34 Initial penalties

24. 904 P.2d at 845-46.
25. Id. at 835.
26. Id. at 835-36.
27. Id. at 836.
28. Scott v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 36 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1503-04 (1994), reversed by
Scott, 904 P.2d at 834.
29. Scott, 904 P.2d at 836.

30.

Id.

31.
Id. at 836-37.
32. Id. at 837.
33. Id. Additionally, Scott and Johnson received a favorable jury verdict in the trial court
on their claim of a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See id. at 838 n.2.
34. Id. at 837.
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included counseling and guidance. These measures were followed by
several intermediate steps and culminated in termination of
employees who could not abide by PG&E's rules3 5 According to the
manual, demotion was an intermediate step "particularly appropriate
when the employee shows an 'ability deficiency.'- 3 6 PG&E presented
no evidence that it used the positive discipline system before demoting
Scott and Johnson, while Scott and Johnson presented evidence that
they were innocent of the allegations PG&E had leveled against
them.37 Because the jury found an implied contractual agreement to
demote only for good cause, and no such cause existed, the court
awarded Scott $700,000 and Johnson $625,000 in past and future
38
economic damages, as well as $75,000 each for emotional distress.
The California Court of Appeals reversed the lower court,
finding that an implied contract term for an action other than termination was "too vague and uncertain to be enforceable."3 9 The
California Supreme Court, however, rejected the appellate court's
argument that the implied contract was too vague40 and held that no
rational reason existed to preclude an employer's policy of only demoting for good cause from becoming an implied contract term. 41 The
court reasoned that an implied agreement not to demote without
cause is no more vague than commonly enforced agreements not to
terminate without cause.4 Further, PG&E's system of positivediscipline provided definite terms on which to base an enforceable contract,
even if the rest of the handbook was too vague to form a contract.43
The California Supreme Court's recognition of wrongful demotion as a
cause of action based on an implied contract made it the first state

35.
36.

Id.
Id.

37.
38.

Id. at 837-38.
Id. at 838. Why the jury awarded emotional damages is unclear. Perhaps they were

provided for PG&E's violation of the California Public Utilities Code since the explanation of the
statutory violation is in a footnote attached to a sentence discussing the emotional damages. Id.
at 838 n.2 (citing Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 453(a) (West 1975 & Supp. 1994)). In addition, this
Public Utilities Code section prohibits discriminatory activity, which is typically more likely to
warrant damages for emotional distress. See Scott, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1510-11 (concluding that
the employees could not maintain an action for violation of Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 453(a)).
39. Scott, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1506.
40. Scott, 904 P.2d at 841.
41. Id. at 839.
42. Id. at 841.
43. Id.
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supreme court to extend an exception to the at-will doctrine beyond
termination.44
C. Wrongful Demotion in JurisdictionsOutside California
Although California was the first jurisdiction to recognize
wrongful demotion based on an implied contract, several other jurisdictions have displayed a willingness to consider wrongful demotion,
under either the implied contract or public policy exceptions to the atwill doctrine. 45 Some jurisdictions considering wrongful demotion
rejected it outright.46 Michigan wrestled extensively with wrongful
demotion after the Michigan Supreme Court first recognized an
exception to the at-will doctrine based on an implied contract in

44. Several lower courts have also recognized wrongful demotion. See Sivell v. Conwed
Corp., 666 F. Supp. 23, 28 (D. Conn. 1987) (holding that Connecticut law does not bar a breach of
contract claim based upon allegations of wrongful demotion); Salimi v. FarmersIns. Group, 684
P.2d 264, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (remanding for further proceedings on a claim of wrongful
demotion based on the existence of an implied contract). See also Richards v. DetroitFree Press,
173 Mich. App. 256, 433 N.W.2d 320, 322 (1988) (concluding that a breach of implied contract
action for wrongful demotion falls within exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine),
remanded by Richards v. Detroit FreePress, 433 Mich. 913, 448 N.W.2d 351, 351 (1989). But see
Fischaberv. General Motors Corp., Buick Motors Div., 174 Mich. App. 450, 436 N.W.2d 386, 389
(1988) (rejecting the existence of wrongful demotion).
45. See Taylor v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 922 F. Supp. 665, 675
(D.D.C. 1996) (concluding that the plaintiff was not wrongfully demoted in violation of public
policy, but reserving decision on whether such a tort action existed); Hoopes v. City of Chester,
473 F. Supp. 1214, 1223-24 n.4 (E.D. Penn. 1979) (remarking that the plaintiff appeared to have
a claim for wrongful demotion based on Pennsylvania's wrongful discharge law); Brigham v.
Dillon Companies, Inc., 262 Kan. 212, 935 P.2d 1054, 1054 (1997) (recognizing the tort of
retaliatory demotion). The prevailing judicial assumption is that an extension of the public
policy exception beyond wrongful discharge would provide public policy protection to all phases of
the employment relationship so that, for example, an employer could not demote an employee for
providing truthful testimony about the criminal activity of her employer. Hoopes, 473 F. Supp. at
1223 n.4. In Hoopes, a sheriff asserted several claims following his demotion for cooperating with
federal law enforcement officials in the prosecution of a city official. Id. at 1215-17. The court
stated, in dicta, that it could find no reason why Pennsylvania's public policy exception
prohibiting retaliation for refusing to violate the law should not apply to demotions as well as
terminations and that the only distinction would be one of damages. Id. at 1223-24 n.4. See also
Taylor, 922 F. Supp. at 675 (rejecting the tort of wrongful demotion in the "whistleblower"
context, but finding that it would be valid in the same situation as wrongful discharge claims,
namely demotions for refusing to violate the law).
46. See Baker v. Perfection Hy-test, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27, *8 (10th Cir.) (applying
Oklahoma law and rejecting the tort of wrongful demotion); Ludwig v. C&A Wallcoverings, Inc.,
960 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1992) (concluding that Illinois law would not allow a tort action for
wrongful demotion); Baragarv. State Farm Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (W.D. Mich. 1994)
(applying Michigan law and rejecting a claim for wrongful demotion based on contract but
admitting that Michigan law was unclear on the issue); Clark v. Eagle Systems, Inc., 279 Mont.
279, 927 P.2d 995, 998-99 (1996) (refusing to recognize wrongful demotion under Montana's
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-904 (1995), which requires
either actual or constructive discharge to state a claim).
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Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan.47 After Toussaint,
a wrongful discharge case, whether the implied contract exception
applied to lesser quantums of discipline such as demotion was unclear.
When the Michigan Court of Appeals held that an employer's promise
not to demote without good cause gave rise to an enforceable contract
in Richards v. Detroit Free Press,8 it appeared that Michigan would
recognize wrongful demotion. 49 The Richards court analogized demotion from a better job to a lesser job as a discharge from the better job,
and stated that "demotion will support a wrongful discharge claim. 5°
Subsequent Michigan appellate decisions, however, refused to
follow Richards and recognize wrongful demotion. 51 The Michigan
Supreme Court has given little indication of how it might resolve the
issue. For example, when an employee claimed that the employer's
change to the compensation system forced him to resign, the Michigan
Supreme Court concluded that the employee had a legally valid claim
for the breach of an oral employment contract. 2 The court's holding
indicated that Toussaint would apply to situations other than wrongful discharge, although the court did not make any explicit statements
to that effect. 53 In a factually similar case, however, the Michigan
Supreme Court wrote that "it does not logically follow that Toussaint
should be extended into the area of compensation."M

47. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (1980).
48. 173 Mich. App. 256, 433 N.W.2d 320, 320 (1988), remanded by Richards v. DetroitFree
Press,433 Mich. 913, 448 N.W.2d 351, 351 (1989).
49. Id. at 322. Richards was demoted from assistant superintendent to a journeyman
printer. Id. Richards argued that his supervisor's assurance that the Press only demoted for
cause created an enforceable contract. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals relied on Toussaint to
conclude that the plaintiffs action was cognizable in Michigan. Id. Other Michigan courts,
however, have been more reluctant to recognize actions for wrongful demotion. See, for example,
Baragar,860 F. Supp. at 1260 (concluding that Michigan law would probably not recognize a
wrongful demotion action based upon an implied contract); Fischaber, 436 N.W.2d at 386
(refusing to allow an action for changes in job assignment that violate an implied contract).
50. Richards, 433 N.W.2d at 322. The Richards decision was remanded on numerous occasions for reconsideration in light of several recent Michigan Supreme Court rulings. See
Richards v. Detroit Free Press,444 Mich. 953, 514 N.W.2d 763, 763 (1994) (denying motion for
reconsideration of the Michigan Supreme Court's denial of leave to appeal); Richards v. Detroit
Free Press,439 Mich. 895, 478 N.W.2d 438, 438 (1991) (remanding Richards,433 N.W.2d at 320,
in light of Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 437 Mich. 627, 473 N.W.2d 268, 268 (1991));
Richards v. Detroit Free Press,433 Mich. 913, 448 N.W.2d 351, 351 (1989) (remanding Richards,
433 N.W.2d at 320, in light of In re Certified Question, 432 Mich. 438, 443 N.W.2d 112, 112
(1989), and Bullock v. Automobile Club of Michigan,432 Mich. 472, 444 N.W.2d 114, 114 (1989)).
51. For Michigan courts reaching opposite results, see note 49.
52. Bullock v. Automobile Club of Michigan,432 Mich. 472, 444 N.W.2d 114, 119-20 (1989).
53. Id. at 120 n.12.
54. Dumas v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 437 Mich. 652, 473 N.W.2d 652, 656 (1991).
Specifically, Dumas concerned three groups of plaintiffs, one of which consisted of 139
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Implied contract actions, such as wrongful demotion, are not a
widely accepted remedy for employees who can prove their employer
broke a promise regarding a term or condition of employment. This
Note will demonstrate that the recognition of wrongful demotion
claims has the potential to reshape the employer-employee relationship in both California and those jurisdictions that follow California's
lead. The doctrinal principles that allowed the Scott court to extend
actions for the breach of an implied contract from termination to
demotion provide no rationale why courts must stop at demotion.
Conceptually, no reason exists why any term or condition of
employment, such as promotion policies, transfer policies, coffee
breaks, or work schedules, will not become subject to implied contract
actions by employees who believe their employer has failed to honor a
promise. 55 Consequently, implied contracts, rather than the at-will
rule, will govern most aspects of the employment relationship unless
some limiting principle exists.
III. LACK OF PRACTICAL AND DOCTRINAL LIMITS TO WRONGFUL
DEMOTION ACTIONS
The Scott court identified a number of reasons that compelled
it to recognize an action for wrongful demotion, but also offered a
variety of principles that would limit the reach of wrongful demotion
and similar implied contract actions. A careful examination of these
limiting principles, however, shows that they will ultimately prove
unsuccessful in restricting litigation over the terms and conditions of
employment. Additionally, subsequent exploration of the underlying
doctrine that compelled the Scott court to recognize wrongful demotion
reveals that the doctrine, in fact, mandates recognition of breach of
implied contract actions for any term or condition of employment, not
just demotion.

salespersons who had been informed when they were hired that they would be paid on a seven
percent commission basis. Id. at 654. After the implementation of a less lucrative flat rate
commission, these claimants attempted to enforce an implied contract to be paid under the seven
percent system. Id. The court found that the plaintiffs could not recover because Toussaint did
not extend beyond the wrongful discharge scenario. Id. at 657.
55. See Scott, 904 P.2d at 838 (discussing California courts' extension of implied-in-fact
contract terms to non-monetary employee benefits). See also Ludwig, 960 F.2d at 43 (stating
that recognition of the tort of wrongful demotion could lead to actions for transfers, promotions,
alterations in job duties, and disciplinary proceedings).
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A. Lack of PracticalLimits
The courts that have rejected public policy and contract exceptions to the at-will doctrine for wrongful demotion have consistently
expressed concern over the possible increase in this type of litigation.56
These courts have also expressed concern about the amount and cost
of litigation associated with wrongful demotion actions, as well as
actions arising from transfers, job duty changes, and discipline. 57 In
response to similar arguments advanced by the Scott defendants,
however, the California Supreme Court proposed three principles that
would limit the amount of litigation surrounding terms and conditions
of employment: manifestations by the employer of an intent not to be
bound by any apparent promises, 5s the doctrine of unenforceability of
vague promises, 59 and limitations on damages available to employees
under a breach of contract action. ° These three principles, however,
do not effectively limit the amount of litigation potentially generated
by the Scott decision.
1. The Limitation on Implied Contract Actions Provided by an
Employer's Manifestation of an Intent Not to Be Bound to
Implied Promises
In Scott, PG&E argued that recognition of a cause of action for
wrongful demotion would violate public policy because it would
"inevitably open the door to a whole host of lesser employment decisions" and involve the courts excessively in the workplace. 61 The court
rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the court thought that
PG&E and other employers could change their policies to avoid the
creation of unwanted contractual obligations. 62 Second, the court
hinted that employer disclaimers, presumably located in employee

56. See Ludwig, 960 F.2d at 43 (observing that "[r]ecognizing a retaliation tort for actions
short of termination could subject employers to torrents of unwanted and vexatious suits filed by
disgruntled employees at every juncture in the employment process"). See also Bullock, 444
N.W.2d at 136 (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that recognizing
breach of implied contract actions for measures short of discharge would be very costly).
57. See note 55 and accompanying text. See also Baragar,860 F. Supp. at 1261-62 (relying
on a Michigan state court's reasoning that recognizing wrongful demotion would lead to timeconsuming and costly litigation to reject a wrongful demotion claim).
58. Scott, 904 P.2d at 844-45.
59. Id. at 845.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 843.
62. Id. at 844.
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handbooks, could prevent liability for wrongful demotion and similar
actions.6 3 Therefore, one proposed means of limiting the litigation
associated with wrongful demotion is for employers to prevent the
creation of unwanted promises. According to the Scott court, employers can prevent unwanted promises either by not making any promises or by disclaiming all promises as non-binding.4
a.

Manifesting an Intent Not to Be Bound by Avoiding
Promises to Employees

An employer's ability to avoid making promises to employees,
however, is severely circumscribed by two practical observations.
First is the growing importance of fringe benefits and other non-traditional compensation to corporations who wish to attract the most
qualified employees. 65 In an era of corporate belt-tightening, employers must offer inducements other than salary to attract employees.
These inducements might include continuing education courses,6 inhouse child care, 67 or corporate perks such as parking spots and private offices. While the Scott court may warn employers not to promise
these benefits if they do not wish to be bound by the promise, the
reality is that such promises are a necessary part of an employer's
business. 68 This need to attract employees with promises about the
terms and conditions of employment undercuts the Scott court's advice
to avoid the creation of implied contracts.
Similarly, many reasons exist why an employer will want to
make promises that the Scott court thinks the employer should avoid.
Promising to impose discipline only for good cause and introducing

63. Id. at 845.
64. Id. at 844-45.
65. See, for example, Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, 1264
(1985) (stating that an employee policy manual providing job security "grants an important,
fundamental protection" to employees), modifed by Woolley v. Hoffmann.La Roche, Inc., 101 N.J.
10, 499 A.2d 515, 515 (1985).
66. Note that 55% of employers in a 1993 survey offered this benefit to employees.
Colonial Life and Accident Company and Employer's Council on Flexible Compensation,
Workplace Pulse National Survey 8 (1993). Other benefits offered by employers included longterm care (44%), wellness programs (33%), health education courses (33%), dependent care
reimbursement (24%), and group legal services (21%). Id.
67. According to one survey, nine percent of American employers offer this benefit,
although 78% provide some sort of child care benefits. Hewitt Associates, Work and Family
Benefits Providedby Major U.S. Employers in 1993, Medical Benefits 11 (Dec. 15, 1993).
68. See Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 118 Wash. 2d 512, 826 P.2d 664, 679 (1992) (binding
employer to promises made by a mid-level supervisor to avoid unionization of corporate
truckers).
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"industrial due process," 69 such as PG&E's positive discipline system,
provide the employer with an improved work force. 70 Indeed, the Scott
court relied on the benefits of the positive discipline system to PG&E
when responding to PG&E's argument that enforcing implied contract
terms would be inherently harmful to employers. 71 The court cited
five improvements the employer receives when instituting programs
similar to PG&E's positive discipline system: (1) a more responsible
and loyal work force as a result of employees who are more committed
to the enterprise, (2) the avoidance of union interference, (3) the
reduction in litigation associated with statutory civil rights claims and
wrongful discharge actions, (4) the ability to attract new employees
72
and retain current ones, and (5) the reduced absenteeism.
Employers who offer flextime, telecommuting, child care subsidies,
near-site day care, and other benefits have found that employee
retention rates, customer retention rates, and corporate profits
increase dramatically. 73
Improved performance as a result of
additional benefits and protections to employees indicates that an
employer may not be able to avoid creating unwanted contractual
obligations.
Consequently, the Scott court's assertion that an
employer can avoid litigation by not making promises appears
unrealistic because of employers' need to attract and retain a
productive and committed work force through the use of "good cause"
provisions, industrial due process, and other benefits.
Another reason an employer may not be able to avoid contractual obligations is that implied promises will invariably arise from
promises casually made by supervisors, or from practices beyond the
control of management. 74 In wrongful discharge actions, implied
promises can be found in any of the circumstances surrounding the

69. "Industrial due process" refers to the self-imposed investigatory and disciplinary
procedures of many employers.
70. Scott, 904 P.2d at 843; Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
71.
Scott, 904 P.2d at 843.
72. Id. (citing James R. Redeker, Employee Discipline: Policies and Practices 106 (BNA,
1989)); Chimezie A. B. Osigweh and William R. Hutchinson, Positive Discipline, 28 Hum.
Resource Mgmt. 367, 382 (1989)).
73. See Stacey Hartmann, Happy Workers Drive Profits, The Tennessean 1E (Mar. 19,
1997) (discussing the positive effects on company profitability when additional benefits are
offered to employees). For example, after instituting numerous "family-friendly" practices, First
Tennessee Bank found that customer service satisfaction increased by 60%, customer retention
increased by 7%, employee retention increased by 100%, and company profits increased by 55%.

Id.
74.

Scott, 904 P.2d at 844-45.
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employment relationship. 75 Relevant factors under a "totality of circumstances" analysis include personnel policies, longevity of service,
assurances of continued employment, and industry practice.7 6 The
Scott court expressed a willingness to examine the totality of the
circumstances to determine if an implied promise regarding demotion
existed. 77 Presumably, therefore, factors similar to those that create
implied contracts in wrongful discharge cases would create promises
regarding other terms and conditions of employment. The understandable willingness of courts to look at the totality of the
surrounding circumstances to find an implied promise indicates that
casual promises made by low or mid-level supervisors, an employer's
treatment of other employees, or industry practice could create an
enforceable right from actions that are largely beyond the control of
management. 78 The ease of finding an implied promise somewhere in
the employment relationship underscores the employer's inability to
79
avoid unwanted contractual obligations.
b. Manifesting an Intent Not to Be Bound to Implied Promises
by DisclaimingAll Promises to Employees
The California Supreme Court suggested that employers could
avoid contractual liability for implied promises through the use of
disclaimers80 In an employee handbook, clear and prominent disclaimers provide employers with a method to avoid binding themselves to any policy contained in the manual.8 ' For example, some
75. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 329.
76. Id.; Scott, 904 P.2d at 839.
77. Scott, 904 P.2d at 839.
78. See Swanson, 826 P.2d at 677 (holding that a disclaimer purporting to require only
president or vice-president authorization of employment contracts is not valid in a multi-national
corporation with thousands of employees).
79. See Scott, 904 P.2d at 844 (discussing PG&E's argument that employers will often be
bound by promises arising from events beyond the control of senior management).
80. Id. at 845.
81. See, for example, Dell v. Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 970, 974 (6th Cir.
1987) (concluding that terms of employment set forth in an employee handbook did not provide
discharged employees with a cause of action for breach of an implied contract); Therrien v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1517, 1522 (D. Colo. 1987) (noting that Colorado law does not
recognize an action for breach of an implied contract based upon provisions in an employee
handbook that clearly stated that the employee handbook did not constitute a contract of
employment); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md. App. 325, 517 A.2d 786, 794 (1986)
(holding that a disclaimer in an employee manual was valid since the disclaimer was contained
in an agreement voluntarily entered into without fraud, mistake, or oppression); Woolley, 491
A.2d at 1271 (stating that disclaimers in employee manuals will be enforced if they are placed in
a prominent place and are adequately worded); Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants,Inc., 398 N.W.2d
120, 123 (N.D. 1986) (concluding that a "clear and conspicuous disclaimer" in an employee
handbook preserved the "presumption of at-will employment"); Taylor v. Systems Research
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employee handbooks contain procedures outlining a system of
"progressive discipline" that requires the employer to follow progressively more severe discipline procedures when disciplining or
discharging an employee.8 2 To avoid using the prescribed disciplinary
system, an employer can include language in the employee handbook
stating that the manual includes no promise of any kind. As a result,
the employer remains free to discharge or demote without cause and
83
ignore its own system of progressive discipline.
The availability of disclaimers as a defense to wrongful demotion and similar actions is an open question despite the widespread
acceptance of the defense in wrongful discharge cases. 84 Although the
Scott court stated that the issue of the use of disclaimers was not
before it, the court suggested that disclaimers might be a method
employers could use to avoid wrongful demotion litigation.85 It seems
unlikely that the court would suggest a defense the court believed was
unavailable. In addition, Justice Souter, writing for the court as a
justice on the New Hampshire Supreme Court, stated that a
disclaimer could relieve the employer of a promise to pay severance
benefits.8 6 This indicates that other courts might also be willing to
expand the use of disclaimers beyond the wrongful discharge
87
scenario.
To understand how an employer's use of disclaimers might be
ineffective in wrongful demotion scenarios, one should understand the
limitations that courts have placed on the effectiveness of disclaimers
in the wrongful discharge scenario.es Generally, two requirements

Laboratories,Inc., 51 Ohio App. 3d 15, 554 N.E.2d 114, 115 (1988) (stating that disclaimers in an
employee handbook create an at-will employment relationship); Meade v. Appalachian Power
Co., 1988 Va. Cir. LEXIS 29, *8-9 (stating that effective disclaimers must be placed in a "very
prominent position" and must be stated in "clear and unambiguous terms").
82. Ferrarav. Nielsen, 799 P.2d 458, 461 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
83. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1271.
84. See Scott, 904 P.2d at 845 (refusing to decide the effect of a disclaimer upon an implied
contractual obligation not to demote an employee).
85. Id.
86. Panto v. Moore Business Forms,Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 286 (1988).
87. The only distinction between a disclaimer covering promises for good-cause termination
and a disclaimer applying to a promise regarding a term or condition of employment is the scope
of the employment relationship covered by the disclaimer. A disclaimer purporting to cover all
terms and conditions of employment is disclaiming all promises created between hiring and
termination. A disclaimer regarding termination purports to cover only one (albeit important)
sliver of the employment relationship.
88. Another possible attack on the use of employer disclaimers was litigated in Heurtebise
v. Reliable Business Computers, 452 Mich. 405, 550 N.W.2d 243, 247 (1996), cert. denied, Reliable
Business Computers v. Heurtebise, 117 S. Ct. 1311, 1311, 137 L. Ed. 2d 474, 474 (1997). In
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must be met to have an effective disclaimer: The disclaimer must be
clear and conspicuous, 89 and it must not be negated by contradictory
promises.9 0 Both requirements will likely pose a problem for employers seeking to avoid liability for the breach of implied contracts.
i. Disclaimers Must Be Clear and Conspicuous
In many jurisdictions, the clear and conspicuous requirement
for the display of disclaimers has become a significant hurdle for

Heurtebise, an employee sought to avoid arbitration of her sexual discrimination grievance with
her employer. Id. at 245. The employer relied on its employee handbook, which stated that
employees "may challenge the propriety of dismissal... only through arbitration."' Id. (quoting
the employee handbook at issue). The document also contained a clear and prominent
disclaimer: " ' Each employee has the absolute right to terminate his/her own employment at any
time, without notice, and for any reason whatsoever, and the company has the same right.'" Id.
at 247 (quoting the employee handbook at issue) (emphasis omitted). The court concluded that
the inclusion of the disclaimer meant that the employer did not intend to be bound by any
provision in the handbook and, therefore, the employee was not required to arbitrate her claim.
Id. The court reached this conclusion in spite of the court of appeal's holding, on an incomplete
record, that the disclaimer only applied to the employee's at-will status. Id. at 246. This case
could be interpreted as saying that employers may not disclaim any promises regarding job
security if they wish to compel arbitration. Given the prominence and widespread use of
arbitration, similar reasoning in other jurisdictions could severely limit an employer's ability to
disclaim promises regarding job security, "for cause" demotion requirements, disciplinary
proceedings, and other terms and conditions of employment. Whether an arbitration agreement
provided somewhere other than in the employee manual would be disclaimed remains an open
question. Such an agreement should be just as enforceable as any other express or implied
promise. Theoretically, the Heurtebiseholding puts employers in a Catch-22. If employers place
the arbitration agreement in the employee manual, then it is negated by a disclaimer. If
employers create a separate arbitration agreement, however, they cannot seek to enforce it
without being bound by other express or implied contracts covering various terms and conditions
of employment that arise independently of the employee manual. See also Meade, 1988 Va. Cir.
LEXIS 29 at *8-11 (implying that a disclaimer in an employee handbook disclaims the entire
contract, including the arbitration clause, because the employee would be bound to arbitrate if
the entire manual was not disclaimed).
89. Jones v. Central Peninsula General Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1989); Hicks v.
Methodist Medical Center, 229 Il1. App. 3d 610, 593 N.E.2d 119, 121-22 (1992); Woolley, 491 A.2d
at 1271; Osterman-Levitt v. Medquest, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 70, 74 (N.D. 1994); Kumpf v. United Tel.
Co. of Carolinas,Inc., 311 S.C. 533, 429 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1993); Swanson, 826 P.2d at 673;
Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329, 341 (1995); McDonald v. Mobil
Coal Producing,Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 989 (Wyo. 1991). See generally George L. Blum, Annotation,
Effectiveness of Employer's Disclaimer of Representations in Personnel Manual or Employee
Handbook Altering At-Will Employment Relationship, 17 A.L.R. 5th 1, 1-2 (1994) ("Blum
Annotation") (collecting cases concerning disclaimers of representations contained in employee
personnel manuals).
90. Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.D.C. 1969); Wagenseller, 710 P.2d
at 1037-38; Morriss v. Coleman Co., Inc., 241 Kan. 501, 738 P.2d 841, 849 (1987); Schipani v.
Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307, 310-11 (1981); Southwest Gas Corp. v.
Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064, 901 P.2d 693, 697 (1995); Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 316 S.C. 452, 450
S.E,2d 589, 596 (1994); Ross v. Times Mirror, Inc., 164 Vt. 13, 665 A.2d 580, 583 (1995);
Swanson, 826 P.2d at 674-75. See Blum Annotation at 1 (cited in note 89) (collecting cases that
discuss the effectiveness of disclaimers contained in employee manuals).
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employers in wrongful discharge cases. 91 Frequently, disclaimers fail
to prevent an employer's liability because they are displayed in an
obscure location, 92 but courts have rejected them for other reasons as
well. For example, disclaimers written in "confusing legalese" do not
provide the clarity necessary to inform an employee that the handbook
does not create a binding promise. 93 Since wrongful demotion actions
cover more promises than wrongful discharge actions, employers will
have more difficulty providing clear and conspicuous disclaimers
regarding the terms and conditions of employment than. regarding
wrongful discharge. Consequently, employers will be even less successful when disclaiming promises regarding the terms and conditions
of employment than when disclaiming promises regarding termination.
More troubling than the conspicuousness requirement for
employers is that disclaimers cannot negate all promises. They must
be directed at specific promises. In the wrongful discharge scenario,
for example, employees who receive oral assurances of job security,
even when the handbook has a broad disclaimer against job security,
are entitled to rely on those assurances because the disclaimer was
limited to the handbook provisions. 94 In another case, a disclaimer in
an employee handbook providing that policy statements in the manual
did not create a contract was found to disclaim only the handbook's

91. See, for example, Preston v. ClaridgeHotel & Casino, Ltd., 231 N.J. Super. 81, 555 A.2d
12, 16 (1989) (finding that a disclaimer that did not use language similar to previous case law
would not disclaim an implied contract for employment); Osterman-Levitt, 513 N.W.2d at 73-74
(finding that a disclaimer stating that "[e]mployment at the hospital is based upon mutual
consent" and that "either the employee or the hospital may find it necessary to sever the
employment relationship" was not explicit enough to be enforceable); Williams, 459 S.E.2d at
340-41 (holding that a disclaimer stating "[m]y employment may be terminated at any time
without advance notice" was not clear, conspicuous, and understandable); McDonald, 820 P.2d at
988-89 (holding that summary judgment for the employer was an error when a disclaimer, which
was not set off by a border or larger print, stated "I agree that any offer of employment, and
acceptance thereof, does not constitute a binding contract of any length, and that such
employment is terminable at the will of either party").
92. See Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 287-88 (Iowa 1995)
(collecting cases and comparing those that found clear and conspicuous disclaimers with those
that did not).
93. See, for example, Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 136 N.J. 401, 643 A.2d 554, 560
(1994) (holding that a disclaimer stating "[tihe terms and procedures contained [in the employee
manual] are not contractual and are subject to change and interpretation at the sole discretion of
the company, and without prior notice or consideration to any employee" was confusing
"legalese").
94. Hanna v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 3d 427, 438-39 (1991),
review denied and opinion withdrawn by Hanna v. Security PacificBusiness Credit, Inc., 91 Cal.
Daily Op. Serv. 7227, 7227 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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policy statements, and did not negate the promise of job security
located elsewhere in the manual. 5 Similarly, in Butler v. Walker
Power, Inc.,s6 a statement that the handbook did not create a contract
of employment was not a valid disclaimer because the disclaimer
97
applied to termination, but left the disciplinary procedures intact.
Significantly, the Butler court relied on Panto v. Moore Business
Forms, Inc.,98 which held that an employer's promise to provide posttermination benefits constituted a binding modification to an
employment contract.9 9 The implication of Panto, according to the
Butler court, is that contractual elements aside from promises of job
security exist and that these elements require separate disclaimers. 1°0
Consequently, disclaimers must be directed at specific promises regarding the terms and conditions of employment and cannot disclaim
all promises within the employment relationship simultaneously. 1 1
Employers will have a particularly difficult time if they must
specifically disclaim every term or condition of employment that can
create an implied contract. Clear and prominent disclaimers will be
especially difficult to provide for unwritten employment practices, the
promises of mid-level supervisors, and other situations outside the
controlled setting of an employee handbook. For example, a supervisor's promise that laid-off workers will be re-hired before new workers
are hired will be almost impossible for an employer to disclaim 10 2

95. Williams, 459 S.E.2d at 341-42.
96. 137 N.H. 432, 629 A.2d 91 (1993). The court found that a disclaimer stating "this
Handbook is not an expressed or implied contract of employment" effectively negated any implied

contract requiring "cause" for termination. Id. at 92-94. The court stated, however, that the
plaintiff could assert damages for the employer's failure to follow its own disciplinary procedure,
which had not been disclaimed. Id. at 94.
97. Id. at 93-94.
98. 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260 (1988).
99. Id. at 265.
100. Butler, 629 A.2d at 93.
101. Id. at 93-94. See, for example, Jones, 779 P.2d at 788 (making a distinction between
the effect of a disclaimer of policy guidelines, such as provisions relating to employee appearance,
and the effect of a disclaimer of provisions conferring rights upon employees, such as grievance
procedures); Farnumv. BrattleboroRetreat, Inc., 164 Vt. 488, 671 A.2d 1249, 1254 (1995) (stating
that a boilerplate disclaimer in an employee handbook that employment is at-will does not
"negate any implied contract [or] procedural protections" created by the handbook); Dent v.
Fruth, 192 W. Va. 506, 453 S.E.2d 340, 343-44 (1994) (stating that disclaimers in an employee
handbook that provided the handbook did not create a contract but that failed to state employment was at-will did not prevent the existence of an implied contract requiring "cause" to
terminate employees).
102. See, for example, Bower v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 852 F.2d 361, 362-63 (8th Cir.
1988) (applying Missouri law and discussing the effect of a promise to re-hire former employees).
The Bower court enforced promises that an AT&T Regional Manager and Warehouse
Superintendent made as AT&T's agents. Id.
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because this and similar promises are made without the knowledge of
103
senior management.
In addition, significant problems exist with allowing employers
to make disclaimers that apply to all implied promises in an employment relationship. Allowing employers to disclaim any and all promises would prevent an employee from relying on any promise made by
a superior-a situation that is undesirable for both employees and
employers alike. Further, a disclaimer attempting to limit employment rights to those granted by the corporate president greatly
reduces an employer's flexibility because supervisors cannot make
promises in an effort to resolve disputes or prevent crises. 104 Some
courts have expressed discomfort with the notion that employers can
attract and retain good workers with implied promises and benefits,
require their employees to follow company policy, and then disclaim or
escape that policy when it no longer suits them. 05

103. See Swanson, 826 P.2d at 666 (binding a corporation to a promise of a supervisor not to
fire truckers without good cause, despite the existence of a disclaimer in the employee handbook
stating that only the president or executive vice-president of the corporation could make
employment contracts).
104. Id. at 676-77 (stating that allowing a disclaimer to have the broad preemptive effect
desired by the corporation would conflict with the employer's need to change its position). In
Swanson, the supervisor entered into an agreement with the corporation's truckers to settle
ongoing salary and seniority disputes and prevent the need for unionization. Id. at 665-66.
105. See, for example, Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d
170, 174 (1984) (stating that when an employer chooses to issue a policy or manual, and its
actions or terms encourage reliance on the policy or manual, despite the existence of a
disclaimer, the employer must abide by the policy or manual and "may not treat it as illusory");
Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1271 (stating, in dicta, that "lt would be unfair to allow an employer to
distribute a policy manual that makes the workforce believe that certain promises have been
made and then to allow the employer to renege" and that "[w]hat is sought here is basic
honesty"); Small v. Springs Industries,Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454-55 (1987) (stating
that equitable and social policies indicate that employers should not be permitted to provide
potentially misleading employee manuals while being able to deviate from them whenever the
employers choose); Farnum, 671 A.2d at 1254 (asserting that inclusion of "boilerplate language"
providing for at-will employment does not "negate any implied contract [or] procedural protections" contained in the handbook); Swanson, 826 P.2d at 677 (stating that an employer is not
"entitled to make extensive promises as to working conditions-promises which directly benefit
the employer in that the employees are likely to carry out their job satisfactorily with promises of
assured working conditions-and then ignore those promises as illusory"); Williams, 459 S.E.2d
at 341 (stating that employers should not possess the ability to deviate from an employee
handbook and "discharge employees for no reason or any reason"). Williams states the point
most directly when explaining why disclaimers deserve a narrow effect:
There is a certain unseemliness in an employer in effect saying to its employees:
"Here are the rules; if you abide by them, I will continue to employ you," while
simultaneously saying: "If you break your promise and fail to abide by the rules, you are
fired; but if I break my promise and fire you for reasons or procedures contrary to the
rules, you cannot do anything about it."
459 S.E.2d at 341 n.22.
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ii. Contradictory Practices Must Not Negate the Disclaimer
Concerns regarding illusory promises also underlie the second
hurdle to a valid disclaimer: The disclaimer may not be negated by
contradictory practices of the employer. The creation of a contract and
the impact of the disclaimer are questions of fact for the jury,°6 and
many jurisdictions consider a disclaimer to be nothing more than one
indicator of intent in an employment contract. 10 7 Consequently, in
addition to the disclaimer, the trier of fact is free to consider other
provisions in the handbook containing promissory language, 08 the
employer's course of conduct, 10 9 the nature of the employment, 110 and
other circumstances surrounding the relationship when determining
whether an implied contract exists.",
In wrongful discharge cases, contradictory practices have been
found to negate a variety of disclaimers in employee handbooks. For
example, courts have rejected disclaimers associated with a hospital's

106. Morriss,738 P.2d at 849; Southwest Gas Corp., 901 P.2d at 697-98; Fleming,450 S.E.2d
at 596; Farnum, 671 A.2d at 1255; Swanson, 826 P.2d at 673.
107. See, for example, Zaccardi v. Zales Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1476-77 (10th Cir. 1988)
(applying New Mexico law and finding that a personnel manual gave rise to an implied contract
based upon an examination of the statements and actions of the parties involved); Morriss, 738
P.2d at 849 (considering statements made by an employee's supervisor and other language
contained in an employee handbook when construing the effect of disclaimer); Southwest Gas
Corp., 901 P.2d at 697-98 (factoring in other promissory language contained in an employee
handbook to consider the effect of a disclaimer); Fleming, 450 S.E.2d at 596 (stating that the
disclaimer is only one factor to consider in deciding whether promises contained in a handbook
should be enforced); Farnum, 671 A.2d at 1254 (observing that a disclaimer must be read in light
of all other circumstances bearing on the employment agreement); Swanson, 826 P.2d at 674-75
(providing examples of employer practices that negate the effectiveness of disclaimers). See also
Patricia M. Leonard, Note, Unjust Dismissal of Employees At Will: Are Disclaimers a Final
Solution, 15 Fordham Urb. L. J. 533, 562 (1987) (concluding that disclaimers are only one factor
to consider in an analysis of a wrongful discharge case).
108. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1038 (noting that the "parameters of the [employment]
relationship" are to be determined from the "totality of the parties' statements and actions");
Morriss, 738 P.2d at 849 (stating that language contained in an employee handbook, along with
other factors, should be considered in determining what terms of employment existed between
the parties).
109. Schipani, 302 N.W.2d at 310-11 (discussing the effect of an employer's oral or written
assurances upon a disclaimer contained in an employee manual); Johnson v. Morton Thiokol,
Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1005 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that an employer's actions
can rebut the presumption of employment at-will and can create implied contract terms); Ross,
665 A.2d at 583 (stating that an employer's conduct can modify a disclaimer set forth in an
employee policy manual).
110. Morriss, 738 P.2d at 849 (noting that the nature of employment often is a factor in
determining the intent of the parties entering into the employment relationship).
111. Id. (listing other factors that courts often examine to determine the intent of the parties
to an employment relationship); Farnum, 671 A.2d at 1255 (stating that a disclaimer must be
examined "in the context of all the other provisions in the [employee] handbook and any other
circumstances bearing on the status of the employment agreement").
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promise to treat all employees fairly and in accordance with Christian
principles," 2 with an employer's customary practice of providing nontenured teachers a hearing before termination, 113 and with an
employer's oral assurance of long-term employment. 1 4 The rationale
for negating clear and prominent disclaimers in the face of
contradictory practices is concern over the enforcement of illusory
promises. 115 The danger is that contradictory practices allow an
employer to receive enhanced morale and employee retention through
assurances of fair disciplinary procedures and other favorable
employment practices but ultimately escape from the cost of following
6
such procedures and practices through a disclaimer."
Contradictory practices are more likely to negate disclaimers
covering wrongful demotion and similar implied contract actions than
disclaimers covering termination. Because termination is a single
defined event in an employment relationship, employers can disclaim
promises regarding job security with comparative ease. 117 Disclaiming
all promises regarding all terms and conditions of employment, however, might be impossible for employers in jurisdictions that are willing to look at contradictory practices. Employers must make some
promises in addition to wages to ensure an orderly and satisfied work
force. Furthermore, supervisors and mid-level managers who are less
concerned with long-term liability and more concerned with the daily
or monthly bottom line are likely to provide incentives and
inducements that create implied contracts. Consequently, the Scott
court's suggestion that disclaimers and other indicators of an
employer's intent not to be bound by implied promises will limit
litigation may be fictitious when applied to implied contract actions
regarding terms and conditions of employment.

112. Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 249 Kan. 124, 815 P.2d 72, 82 (1991).
113. Greene, 412 F.2d at 1131.
114. Southwest Gas Corp., 901 P.2d at 697.
115. Leikvold, 688 P.2d at 174 (concluding that if an employer issues a policy statement and
encourages reliance on the statement, it may not treat the promise as illusory).
116. See Ross, 665 A.2d at 583 (stating that other circumstances must be considered when
evaluating the effectiveness of a disclaimer because, if not, the "employer could have it both
ways-enjoying the morale-enhancing benefits of fair procedures most of the time, but relying on
a handbook disclaimer whenever it chose to jettison its procedures in a particular case").
117. Scott, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1507.
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2. The Limitation on Implied Contract Actions Provided by the
Unenforceability of Vague Promises
Another potential limit to wrongful demotion claims and similar actions regarding other terms and conditions of employment is
that many implied promises may be too vague to enforce. This situation is particularly troublesome when an employee seeks to bind an
employer to a policy promising some sort of substantive right, as
118
opposed to a procedural guarantee.
The California Court of Appeals relied on the unenforceability
of vague promises when it refused to recognize wrongful demotion as a
valid cause of action.1' 9 The appellate court stated that promotions,
demotions, transfers, and "other operational decisions" were inherently uncertain promises because of the large variety of factors that
were considered to create such promises. 120 Because factors such as an
employer's personnel policies, oral assurances, and praise, promotion,
or criticism of the employee could all lead to an implied contract,' 2' the
court concluded that too many methods existed by which an employee
122
could discern an implied promise.
Other courts have struggled with uncertain implied promises
in the employment context. For example, a statement that the employer is "vitally interested in encouraging... personal growth and
development" and, therefore, constantly evaluates the "employee's
responsibility and worth," is too vague to promise anything that might
prevent demotion.123
Similarly, a promise to consider the
compensation of employees in other companies is too vague to support
an action alleging that an employer had broken its promise to keep
employees adequately compensated. 124 Perhaps the most significant

118. See Scott, 904 P.2d at 841 (discussing, and dismissing, an employer's contention that
an implied promise "not to demote without good cause and to follow certain disciplinary rules"
was unenforceably vague).
119. Scott, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1506. The court of appeals also thought the damages were
too vague to permit recovery. Id. at 1510. For a discussion of why the damages award in a
wrongful demotion action might be vague, see Part III.B.3.
120. Scott, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1506-07.
121. Id. at 1507.
122. Id.
123. Rodgers v. Flint Journal,779 F. Supp. 70, 72 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
124. Ladas v. CaliforniaState Automobile Ass'n, 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 771 (1993). For other
cases finding promises unenforceably vague, see Hunt v. IBM Mid America Employees Federal
Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Minn. 1986) (asserting that a handbook provision stating
"[i]n the event of serious offense, an employee may be terminated immediately" is too vague to
create an implied contract when "serious offense" is not defined); Bautch v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,
278 N.W.2d 328, 329-31 (Minn. 1979) (stating that a discharge for violating a rule against
restaurant employees eating food without payment is unenforceably vague when managers
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case finding a promise unenforceably vague is Rochlis v. Walt Disney
Co.125 In Rochlis, a former senior executive at Walt Disney brought an
unsuccessful action alleging breach of implied promises to pay salary
increases "appropriate" to the employee's performance and to allow
him to participate meaningfully in the employer's creative decisions,
and report directly to Disney's Chief Executive Officer. 126 According to
the Scott court, Rochlis exemplified the limits that vagueness would
impose on the implied contract claims that PG&E contended would
flood employers if wrongful demotion were recognized.27
Several factors indicate, however, that this limitation on the
scope of the Scott decision is not as severe as it might appear. First,
the inquiry by a trier of fact into whether a promise was made to
demote only for cause and whether such cause existed is "virtually
identical to the inquiry it would be called on to make in the wrongful
discharge context and a host of other contractual settings."28 No
reason exists why a court should be less willing to let a jury decide an
allegedly vague promise regarding a term or condition of employment
than an allegedly vague promise regarding termination. If a jury can
decide that an employer's promise to return an employee to a position
of "equivalent or greater responsibility" following permissive leave is
clear enough to create an implied contract, then a jury can decide
whether a system of positive discipline creates a promise to demote
29
only for good cause.
Second, a variety of tools are available for the trier of fact to
flesh out apparently vague promises. An employer's treatment of
other employees regarding the same benefit provides significant in-

routinely ignored the rule); Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 368 (Okla. 1994) (asserting
that a handbook provision stating "[t]he Company will respect the privacy of its employees" is too
vague to be enforced); Machen v. Budd Wheel Co., 294 Pa. 69, 143 A. 482, 485 (1928) (stating that
a company's assurance that an employee's future with the company would be certain if he turned
over a patent was no more than a "friendly assurance" of employment and too vague to permit
enforcement).
125. 19 Cal. App. 4th 201 (1993).
126. Id. at 213.
127. Scott, 904 P.2d at 845.
128. Id. at 841.
129. See Sepanske v. Bendix Corp., 147 Mich. App. 819, 384 N.W.2d 54, 59 (1985)
(concluding that a jury must determine whether a promise to return an employee to a position of
"equivalent or greater responsibility" created an implied contract and upholding a jury
determination that a position in a tax department was not equivalent to a position in a payroll
department).
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sight into agreements made with the entire work force. 130 In addition,
if a problem with vagueness exists in the terms of an employment contract, particularly when the contract arises from an employee handbook or other written instrument, the ambiguity is created by the
employer, who should be bound by the contract. 131 The fact that the
employer is often the drafter of employee handbooks mitigates the
apparent harshness of holding an employer to an allegedly vague
promise. 13 2 Finally, as in Scott, when promises regarding "for cause"
demotion or discipline are vague, an employer's failure to follow its
own disciplinary procedures is often easy to discern. 33 In fact, in
Salimi v. Farmers Insurance Group, the Colorado Court of Appeals
recognized a wrongful demotion action based solely on the employer's
failure to follow its own disciplinary procedures."3
Vagueness may preclude some employees from pursuing claims
for wrongful demotion or similar actions, but the number of precluded
employees should not be overstated. The limits imposed by vagueness
in wrongful demotion cases, like vagueness in wrongful discharge
cases, are questions of fact that are easily resolved by a jury's
examination of an employer's course 'of conduct. Furthermore, an
employer's failure to follow its own disciplinary procedures often
provides a red flag that something is amiss. Once again, a potential
limitation on actions that are based on the breach of an implied
contract for a term or condition of employment appears largely
ineffective.
3. The Limitation on Implied Contract Actions Provided by the
Lack of Ascertainable Damages
A final potential limit on implied contract actions regarding
various terms and conditions of employment is briefly worth considering. The argument is that a court's ability to ascertain significant
damages will limit litigation. Nothing warrants the belief that dam-

130. See Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1269 (concluding that, despite the lack of certain terms, an
employment agreement was enforceable, in part because the agreement applied to the employer's
entire workforce).
131. See id. (stating that an employer should gain no advantage from any ambiguity in
terms created by the employer).
132. See Swanson, 826 P.2d at 678 (rejecting the argument that an employer should be able
to discharge without notice an employee for fighting, even though fighting was not on the list of
no-notice offenses, because the employer set out the policy in the employee handbook).
133. See Scott, 904 P.2d at 841 (concluding that an employer's rules and procedures concerning demotion were "sufficiently clear to permit a trier of fact to determine whether the company
had complied with them").
134. 684 P.2d 264, 264-65 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
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ages will be any harder to ascertain in wrongful demotion actions than
in wrongful discharge actions. Indeed, the Scott trial court readily
135
accepted the damages that the court of appeals found speculative.
The court of appeals found that damages were not reasonably certain
because the award of future earnings was based on the difference
between the plaintiffs' salaries in their lower and higher paid positions, and nothing prevented the plaintiffs from leaving PG&E after
receiving the award and accepting a job at a salary commensurate
with their higher paid positions. 136 Awarding damages in this situation, however, is no more uncertain than many ADEA front-pay
137
awards for demotion.
Furthermore, as the Scott court noted, an employer's failure to
follow disciplinary procedures breaches an implied contract. 3 8 A
limited number of cases have held that full contract damages are
available for a termination or demotion that is not in compliance with
the employer's own disciplinary procedures.3 9 Allowing full contract
damages makes sense because failure to follow the promised procedures is as much a breach of contract as a demotion in violation of a
good cause provision. Similar types of remedies in other statutory
schemes and the widespread existence of industrial due process
indicate that a lack of any ascertainable damages will filter out only
the weakest implied contract claims. Therefore, a promise to provide
a certain number of coffee breaks would not be enforceable because
the damages are not ascertainable. A lack of ascertainable damages,
however, appears unlikely to affect larger claims, such as wrongful
demotion, failure to promote, and wrongful refusals to provide merit

135. Compare Scott, 904 P.2d at 846 (noting the existence of an "ascertainable pecuniary
loss" as a result of the employer's breach) with Scott, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1510 (stating that "the
measure of damages is speculative").
136. Scott, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1510.
137. See, for example, Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26,
*11-13 (S.D.N.Y.) (awarding front pay for a demotion that violated the ADEA); Zampino v.
Supermarkets General Corp., 821 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (same).
138. Scott, 904 P.2d at 840.
139. Mecurio v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 92 Ohio App. 3d 131, 634 N.E.2d 633, 636 (1993)
(affirming an award of back pay and front pay for an employer's failure to follow its own
disciplinary procedures before terminating an employee). See also Zaccardi, 856 F.2d at 1477
(finding that an employer's failure to follow its own disciplinary procedures, without more,
creates an issue for a jury); Greene, 412 F.2d at 1131 (concluding that an implied contract to
provide a disciplinary hearing allows teachers who were denied the hearing to prove and recover
damages); Salimi, 684 P.2d at 265 (reversing a dismissal of a breach of contract action for a
demotion that only violated an employer's grievance procedures); Frainv. City of St. Paul, 261
Minn. 409, 112 N.W.2d 795, 796-98 (1962) (awarding damages to an employee who was demoted
by a city without a required hearing).
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salary increases. 140 Regardless, the fact that employees may lack an
incentive to seek damages for smaller claims does not affect the constraining impact on at-will employment of recognizing wrongful demotion.
4. Summary of the Practical Limits to Wrongful Demotion Actions
The California Supreme Court postulated three potential limits
on the expansion of implied contract actions beyond wrongful demotion. First, employers can either avoid making any promises that
would create an implied contract or disclaim any promises that are
made. This limit is ineffectual because employers need to be able to
make promises to employees and because disclaimers must be clear
and conspicuous to be effective and may be negated by contradictory
practices. Second, the Scott court stated that many implied promises
regarding terms and conditions of employment are unenforceably
vague. This limitation is no more effective in claims regarding terms
or conditions of employment than it is in a wrongful discharge scenario, and furthermore, surrounding circumstances can clarify seemingly vague promises. Third, the Scott court speculated that damages
might not be ascertainable for the more "minor matters" an employee
may bring to court. Employer disciplinary procedures, however, are
often clear enough to indicate a breach of an implied contract when
other provisions are vague. In addition, no reason exists to expect
that determining damages will be any more difficult in wrongful demotion cases than in wrongful discharge cases. Because the Scott
decision is not limited by any of the external factors identified by the
California Supreme Court, one should look for a limitation that is
provided by the doctrine of the implied contract itself.
B. Lack of DoctrinalLimits
Analysis of employment agreements does not follow typical
bilateral contract rules, which require a promise to be exchanged for a
promise. Instead, most courts use unilateral contract analysis when
analyzing implied employment agreements.141 Under a unilateral

140. See Osterman-Levitt, 513 N.W.2d at 73 (reciting portions of an employee handbook
containing such provisions).
141. See Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 325-26 (stating that "no analytical reason" exists why a
promise by an employee to render services may not support an employer's promise "both to pay a
particular wage and to refrain from arbitrary dismissal"); Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892
(concluding that employer statements of policy can unilaterally create contractual rights enforceable by employees); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1267 (stating that an employee policy manual is an
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contract analysis, showing that the employee made a promise in exchange for the employer's promise, for example, to demote only for
good cause, is unnecessary. 4 2 The employer's verbal assurances or
circulation of an employee handbook constitute an offer the employee
can accept by continued work. In addition, the employee's continued
work provides consideration for the employer's promise.'43
Traditionally, courts attacked the unilateral approach on the
grounds that the employee needed to provide independent consideration to support the implied contract.'4 The employee's agreement to
work, reasoned these courts, was only consideration for the employer's
promise to pay wages. 4 5 Courts applying a unilateral contract analysis, however, rejected the traditional approach, arguing that it is
contrary to the general rule that a court will not inquire into the
adequacy of consideration.4 6 Because they refused to inquire into the
adequacy of consideration, these courts agreed that undivided consideration may be exchanged for one or several promises, given
together or separately.4 7 Additionally, no requirement exists for a

"offer that seeks the formation of a unilateral contract'). See also Panto, 547 A.2d at 266
(categorizing and explaining various approaches to enforcing implied contracts arising from
employee manuals). In 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote that "most out-of-state cases
demonstrate an unwillingness to give contractual force to company policy manuals." Woolley,
491 A.2d at 1262 (citing cases that did not imply contracts based upon employee policy manuals).
In 1984, one commentator calculated that only 18 jurisdictions recognized implied-in-fact
contracts, including employee manuals, in the employment context. Kenneth T. Lopatka, The
Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A QuadrennialAssessment of the Labor Law Issue of the
80s, 40 Bus. Law. 1, 17 & n.92 (1984). By 1994, however, only six jurisdictions (Delaware,
Florida, Indiana, Missouri, North Carolina, and Tennessee) had refused to recognize employee
handbooks as a source for creating implied contracts for job security, while 10 others (Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Virginia) had no clear indication from the state courts. Employment at Will State
Rulings Chart, 123 Individual Empl. Rights Man. (BNA) 505:51-52 (1994).
142. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1267.
143. Pugh, 16 Cal. App. 3d at 325; Salimi, 684 P.2d at 265; Panto, 547 A.2d at 268; Woolley,
491 A.2d at 1267.
144. Lopatka, 40 Bus. Law. at 18 (cited in note 141).
145. See id. at 17 (discussing the rejection of a unilateral contract analysis by some courts).
146. Pugh, 16 Cal. App. 3d at 325; Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1267; Lopatka, 40 Bus. Law. at 17
(cited in note 141).
147. Pugh, 16 Cal. App. 3d at 325; Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1267. See Joseph M. Perillo and
Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender, 2 Corbin on Contracts§ 5.12 at 56 (West, 1995) (allowing a "single
and undivided consideration" to be exchanged for multiple promises). Also, note that courts
requiring independent consideration to enforce a provision in an employee manual generally
require this consideration as a rule of construction, not of substance. See Pugh, 16 Cal. App. 3d
at 326 (stating that a rule requiring independent consideration is a rule of construction serving
an evidentiary function, rather than a substantive requirement).
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meeting of the minds or other bargaining, which had been another
stumbling block to finding implied contracts in the workplace. 14s
Unilateral contract analysis allows employees to bind their
employers to policies outlined in employee handbooks. 49 In the typical
case, an employer circulates a handbook outlining policies and
procedures the employer will follow before disciplining or discharging
an employee. The handbook may also make statements regarding
stock options, 150 sick days, demotions, 51 severance pay, 52 or other employee concerns. An employer who circulates such a manual may. be
bound by those provisions regarding discharge of an employee when
the provisions give the employee a reasonable expectation of receiving
those benefits. 5 Until Scott, employers had been bound to provisions
or assurances regarding job security but generally had been free to
ignore other provisions. The Scott court reasoned that no inherent
requirement exists to restrict unilateral contract analysis to termination provisions when the same handbook may make similar promises
regarding other terms and conditions of employment.114 The fact that
demotion is a lesser quantum of discipline than termination should
not affect the enforceability of any promise made to demote for cause,
55
except as to the measure of damages.
Similar reasoning appears to support the decision of a Colorado
appellate court that reversed the dismissal of a wrongful demotion
claim by an employee alleging that his employer failed to follow its
own disciplinary procedures. 156 The court did not distinguish between
discharge and demotion and simply applied unilateral contract

148. Toussaint,292 N.W.2d at 892; Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1267. See Pugh, 16 Cal. App. 3d at
325-26 (omitting bargaining as a requirement for enforcing employee policy manual provisions).
149. See Lopatka, 40 Bus. Law. at 17-26 (cited in note 141) (discussing some courts'
application of implied contract terms to defeat employment at-will).
150. Newberger v. Rifkind, 28 Cal. App. 3d 1070, 1072 (1972).
151. Scott, 904 P.2d at 836.
152. Panto, 547 A.2d at 261.
153. See generally Richard A. Winters, Note, Employee Handbooksand Employment At.Will
Contracts, 1985 Duke L. J. 196, 205-19 (discussing different analytical approaches to binding
employers to employee handbooks).
154. Scott, 904 P.2d at 839. See Anthony v. Jersey Central Power & Light, 51 N.J. Super.
139, 143 A.2d 762, 764 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958) (applying unilateral contract analysis to
enforce an employer's alleged implied promise to provide severance benefits).
155. See Hoopes, 473 F. Supp. at 1224 n.4 (stating, in dicta, that any distinction between

demotion and termination would "seem to go only to the measure of damages, and not to the
recognition of the employee's cause of action"); Scott, 904 P.2d at 845-46 (rejecting an employer's
argument that implied contract terms outside the realm of wrongful termination should not be
enforced).
156. Salimi, 684 P.2d at 264-65.
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to find an implied promise to
analysis to the employee handbook
157
follow the disciplinary procedures.
Other courts have occasionally bound employers to promises
beyond job security provisions. 158 The Michigan Court of Appeals
found that wrongful demotion fell within the state's implied contract
exception to wrongful discharge because a "demotion from one job to a
lesser job is a discharge from the first job.' ' 59 Courts that have been
willing to look beyond job security provisions for implied promises
have held employers to promises to re-hire laid-off employees, 160 and to
pay stock options, 161 severance benefits, 162 and pensions. 63 These
courts have relied on unilateral contract analysis to allow claims for
breach of an implied contract.'6
One common factor in decisions applying unilateral contract
analysis to cases other than termination is that the benefit offered by
the employer, allegedly as a gratuity, created an incentive for the
employee to continue working. 65 For example, in Hepp v. LockheedCalifornia Co.,'6 employees alleged that Lockheed had breached a
promise to re-hire laid-off employees before hiring new applicants.167
In response to Lockheed's argument that such a promise was not
binding for lack of consideration, the court stated "[a]n employee
might well be induced to take employment with defendant in spite of
the risk of periodic layoff if the employee knows he will be given
preference in rehiring... as economic conditions change."' 168
The
existence of similar incentives in other implied contracts indicates

157. Id.
158. See Richards, 433 N.W.2d at 321-22 (finding an implied contract to demote only for

cause).
159. Id. at 322. Richards is virtually isolated among Michigan cases finding wrongful
demotion. Supporting cases include Schipani, 302 N.W.2d at 307, but opposing cases include
Fischaber,436 N.W.2d at 386.
160. Bower, 852 F.2d at 363; Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 718-19

(1978).
161. Newberger, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 1076.
162. Chinn v. China NationalAviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91, 93-94 (1955);
Panto, 547 A.2d at 267; Anthony, 143 A.2d at 764-66.
163. Hunter v. Sparling,87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P.2d 807, 815 (1948).
164. See Hepp, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 719 (concluding that an employee's continued employment
constituted consideration for an employer's promise to rehire laid-off employees); Anthony, 143
A.2d at 764 (concluding that an employer's promise to provide severance pay constituted an "offer
in return for rendition of services in employment by the employee").
165. Hepp, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 719; Anthony, 143 A.2d at 764.
166. 86 Cal. App. 3d 714 (1978).
167. Id. at 719.

168. Id.
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that some courts may be receptive to implied contract actions
regarding terms or conditions of employment. The reasoning indicates
that nothing mandates that unilateral contract analysis stop with
169
wrongful discharge claims.
At least one court, however, has reached the opposite conclusion when analyzing a claim for the breach of an implied promise regarding a term or condition of employment. In Dumas v. Auto Club
Insurance Association,170 the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether an employer could change its compensation system
despite having promised its employees that it would continue to use
its original compensation system. 17' Conceptually, the question was
whether an employee had any contractual rights, aside from promises
regarding termination, based on an employee handbook or implied
contract.
Previously, in Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme Court had
indicated its willingness to bind employers to promises beyond discharge."72 This position was grounded in a discussion of earlier
173
Michigan cases that required employers to provide death benefits,
severance pay, 74 or profit sharing income 75 to employees who had
received assurances of such payments. 176 The Toussaint court went on
to conclude that employers who establish a personnel policy to terminate only with good cause create a legitimate expectation by the employee of such treatment. 77 As a result, such policies contractually
T
bind the employer. 8
In Dumas, the plaintiff sought to bind an employer to statements regarding the form of compensation. 7 9 Initially, the decisions
cited in Toussaint and the court's language in Toussaint appeared to

169. Scott, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1514 (White, P.J., dissenting) (stating that "I perceive no
reason why the contract principles enunciated in Pugh... are not equally applicable to implied
contracts not to discipline employees without good cause").
170. 437 Mich. 652, 473 N.W.2d 652 (1991).
171. Id. at 654. The company changed its commission plan from one based on a percentage
of sales to one based on a fixed rate commission for each sale. Id.
172. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 894. The court stated that "[t]he right to continued
employment absent cause for termination may, thus, because of stated employer policies and
established procedures, be enforceable in contract just as are rights so derived [from] bonuses,
pensions, and other forms of compensation." Id.
173. Psutka v. MichiganAlkali Co., 274 Mich. 318, 264 N.W. 385, 386 (1936).
174. Gaydos v. White Motor Corp., 54 Mich. App. 143, 220 N.W.2d 697, 700 (1974); Clarke v.
Brunswick Corp., 48 Mich. App. 667, 211 N.W.2d 101, 102-03 (1973).
175. Couch v. Administrative Committee of the Difco Laboratories,Inc., SalariedEmp. Profit
Sharing Trust, 44 Mich. App. 44, 205 N.W.2d 24, 25-26 (1972).
176. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 894.
177. Id. at 893-94.
178. Id. at 894-95.
179. Dumas, 473 N.W.2d at 655-56.
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preclude the employer from changing the form of compensation. The
Michigan Supreme Court, however, distinguished the earlier cases by
saying that the benefits provided by the employer in those cases were
exchanged for work already performed and, therefore, those cases
operated under "traditional contract principles." 80 By contrast, under
Toussaint, which "does not follow traditional contract analysis," an
employee must show a legitimate expectation of the benefit.'8 '
Because Dumas did not concern employees with vested contract
rights, the court held that traditional contract analysis was
unavailable and that the case would necessarily have to fall within
Toussaint to bind the employer to the original compensation system.182
The court refused to extend Toussaint beyond the "wrongful discharge
scenario," because doing so would interfere with the business
judgment and discretion of corporate officers and hamper the need for
businesses to be adaptable and flexible in the "modern economic
climate."

8 3

Concerns regarding litigation and judicial oversight are the
crux of employers' resistance to actions for wrongful demotion and
other implied contract actions.184 Employers fear that expensive litigation initiated by disgruntled employees raising trivial and frivolous
issues will swamp their business. 8 5 They also worry about the efficiency of operating in a setting in which managers, manuals, and
departmental practice must be scrutinized in an effort to avoid lawsuits. 86 While the employers' concerns may be overstated, they reflect
the policy arguments frequently raised by defendants in wrongful
demotion litigation. Such concerns probably explain the different
results of the Dumas case, as compared to the Scott case. Part IV will

180. Id. at 656.

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 656-57.
184. See Scott, 904 P.2d at 843 (discussing and dismissing an employer's concerns regarding
the increased costs of extending implied agreements to employee demotion); Dumas, 473 N.W.2d
at 656-57 (discussing the reluctance of courts to interfere with the "needed flexibility of business
to change their policies to respond to changing economic circumstances"); Bullock, 444 N.W.2d at
136 (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the "enormous potential cost"
that could result from the extension of the Toussaintdecision beyond wrongful discharge).
185. See Scott, 904 P.2d at 843 (discussing an employer's claim that enforcing implied
agreements governing employee demotion will "inevitably open the door to lawsuits concerning a
whole host of lesser employment decisions").
186. See id. (discussing an employer's concerns that enforcing implied agreements governing
employee demotion would lead to judicial intrusion on an employer's "exercise of managerial

discretion").

1608

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1577

examine this policy and look for countervailing policies in an effort to
resolve the fundamental difference between the Dumas court and the
Scott court.
IV. POLICIES UNDERLYING WRONGFUL DEMOTION
The resistance to actions based on implied contracts regarding
terms and conditions of employment has centered on concerns about
judicial overinvolvement in the management of the employer's business. Employers argue that judicial second-guessing reduces flexibility and increases costs. 187 Furthermore, in efforts to minimize these
effects, employers may react by granting fewer benefits and establishing fewer clear policies. If implied contracts are not recognized, however, aggrieved employees argue that they accepted employment
under false pretenses. They also claim that attracting qualified employees with policies and promises that the employer has no intention
of honoring is unfair. Courts must reconcile these conflicting policies
when deciding actions for wrongful demotion.
In Scott, PG&E resisted the wrongful demotion action by
arguing that "every act or omission regarding performance evaluations, promotions, transfers, or other perquisites would be subject to
judicial determination as to whether the policy or practice at issue
contained an implied 'good cause' promise," leading to a "judicial
invasion" into the employer's business. 188 This is the employers' fundamental objection to actions such as wrongful demotion. Justice
Griffin of the Michigan Supreme Court echoed the concern in response
to the court's decision allowing a breach of contract action based on an
implied contract concerning an employer's promised method of
compensation. 189 He wrote that "it is difficult to imagine the scope of
difficulties and mischief that would be encountered if judicial
exceptions to the at-will doctrine were extended beyond wrongful
discharge into every facet of the employment relationship."'90 Justice
Griffin claimed that extending the implied contract exception beyond
wrongful discharge cases would entail "enormous" costs and cause
significant damage to the employer-employee relationship. 191

187. See id. (discussing arguments made by an employer that enforcing implied agreements
governing employee demotion would lead to higher costs and decreased productivity).
188. Id.
189. Bullock, 444 N.W.2d at 136 (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. Id.
191. Id.
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The potential response by employers faced with expanded
liability for implied promises creates further policy concerns. If employers seek to prevent liability by not making promises, as the Scott
court suggests, 192 they may restrict the authority of mid-level
managers and supervisors to make binding promises. Restricted in
this manner, mid-level managers and supervisors may send even the
most detailed questions to the executive level in an effort to avoid
making unauthorized promises. 193 The inflexibility and stagnation
that would result in decision making would impair employers' recognized need to be adaptive and efficient. 94 Generally, courts have been
of
reluctant to interfere with an employer's business judgment because 195
concerns about inefficiency and lack of judicial business acumen.
The same concerns apply with equal force when recognizing actions
like wrongful demotion.
Another possible employer response includes creating personThis
nel policies and promises so vague as to be unenforceable. 1'
approach would have a deleterious effect on employees, who could not
be sure upon which benefits and procedures they could rely, and on
courts, who would be left with an unidentifiable standard and two
equally compelling interpretations. More troubling is that employers,
fearing potential litigation, may choose not to provide many of the
benefits or internal disciplinary procedures that could eventually lead
to lawsuits. 197 Consequently, a large number of employees who enjoy
these benefits may be deprived of them. Ironically, a cause of action
adopted to help employees receive promised benefits and procedures
may cause employers to eliminate those benefits and procedures,
rather than face liability for failure to comply with them.

192. Scott, 904 P.2d at 844.
193. See Swanson, 826 P.2d at 673-79 (finding that a disclaimer attempting to invalidate all
employment decisions except those made by the corporate president or vice-president was not an
obstacle to an action based on the breach of an implied promise).
194. See Dumas, 473 N.W.2d at 656-57 (stating that the need for business flexibility precludes actions beyond wrongful termination). But see Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 894 (rejecting

this argument).
195. See Dumas, 473 N.W.2d at 656-57 (concluding that courts should not interfere with the
business judgment of corporate officers and directors).
196. See Western States Minerals Corp. v. Jones, 1991 Nev. LEXIS 17, *55 (Steffen, J.,
dissenting) (stating that judicial use of employee handbooks will cause employers to "load" their
handbooks with disclaimers and non-commitment language), rehearing granted and opinion
withdrawn in Western States Minerals Corp. v. Jones, 107 Nev. 116, 807 P.2d 1392, 1392 (1991).
197. Id. See also Williams, 459 S.E.2d at 341 (recognizing that opening employers to liability through a narrow interpretation of a disclaimer in an employee handbook may cause some
employers not to issue handbooks).
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Fear of high costs, loss of employer discretion, and the creation
of incentives adverse to employee interests may inhibit some courts
from recognizing actions for wrongful demotion. Courts could justify a
distinction between, the widely recognized action for wrongful discharge and the controversial action for wrongful demotion by noting
that termination is a form of "economic capital punishment," whereas
demotion or cutting a coffee break by five minutes is within an
employer's policy-making realm. 198 Such a position would create firstand second-class employment rights. Employee terminations would be
treated as a first-class right entitled to heightened scrutiny, whereas
actions falling short of demotion would be second-class rights subject
to increased deference to the employer. 99
The distinction between discharge and demotion evaporates,
however, when the policy issues are viewed contractually.
Contractually, the employer is not sacrificing flexibility or profits
when it provides benefits or procedures to its employees. Instead, the
employer is seeking to improve its work force through improved
morale and favorable working conditions.
Therefore, implied
contracts are properly viewed as a voluntary exchange of employer
benefits for enhanced productivity 'and compliance with company
policy. The employer has bargained away its discretion and flexibility
and, therefore, "may not treat its promise as illusory."2°° Furthermore,
the courts do not restrict the employer under a contractual view
because a contract, even an implied contract, is within the employer's
20
policy-making realm. '

198. Baragar,860 F. Supp. at 1262. But see Brigham, 935 P.2d at 1058 (rejecting appellate
court's distinction between discharge and demotion).
199. The distinction between first- and second-class employment rights is analogous to
distinctions made in First Amendment jurisprudence, in which commercial speech (as opposed to
political speech) is a second-class right and restrictions on it receive less scrutiny than other first
amendment claims. See, for example, VirginiaBoard of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976) (granting deference to legislative regulation of
commercial speech and suggesting that commercial speech should receive a "different degree of
protection" than noncommercial speech). See also id. at 786 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Court created "second-class First Amendment rights ... in commercial speech").
200. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 893. See Leikvold, 688 P.2d at 1704 (stating that an
employer who chooses to issue a policy manual and who encourages reliance on the policies may
not "selectively abide" by the policies); Scott, 904 P.2d at 843 (holding that employers' "voluntary
commitments" to personnel policies are not contrary to public policy). See also Ross, 665 A.2d at
583-84 (stating that the employer has the power to control its contractual obligations).
201. See Scott, 904 P.2d at 844-45 (noting that an employer has the ability to avoid
."unwanted contractual obligations" by altering its policies and procedures); Toussaint, 292
N.W.2d at 892 (stating that an employer has the power to control its contractual obligations);
Panto, 547 A.2d at 268 (noting that an employer can avoid its obligations by stating that the
policies at issue are not enforceable).
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Similar reasoning explains why employers will be reluctant to
abolish implied promises in their businesses. Employers expect and
receive benefits from their implied promises.2 02 Even a benefit as
mundane as a fifteen-minute coffee break is provided under the
assumption that the employee is more productive with an occasional
rest. Employers are probably not willing to sacrifice the acknowledged
benefits of established disciplinary procedures because of implied
contract actions, although they may attempt to apply those procedures
more consistently rather than face liability for ignoring them.
Undoubtedly, some employers will make vague promises in
hopes of attracting and retaining* employees and then use the
vagueness defense to avoid complying with the promises. Concern
over the use of vague promises to prevent employee lawsuits, however,
seems premature. Employers are unlikely to use this defense for two
reasons. First, the procedures and policies in employee manuals and
other sources are provided for reasons other than merely attracting
and retaining productive employees. Clear procedures and policies
allow management to avoid litigation by using consistent and nondiscriminatory guidelines in its treatment of employees. 2 0 3 Second,
vague procedures may actually lead to increased litigation because an
aggrieved employee is likely to see promises when an employer sees
nothing and file a lawsuit nonetheless. 2 4 Vague policies and procedures seem likely to create litigation by allowing employee perceptions
of fair treatment and discriminatory motives greater latitude than
clear procedures and policies might allow.
Employer concerns about judicial oversight are nullified by
viewing the employment arrangement contractually. An employer
bargains for improved morale,05 reduced absenteeism,20 and an enhanced ability to attract employees and provides "for cause" demotion
provisions and fair disciplinary procedures in return. 20 7 An employer
who seeks to benefit from employee inducements but wants to avoid

202. James R. Redeker, Employee Discipline: Policies and Practices 106 (BNA, 1989)
(outlining the benefits that employers receive from developing employee due process and
discipline systems).
203. Id.
204. See notes 123-27 and accompanying text (listing cases refusing to enforce implied
promises in the employment setting because the promises made by employers were too vague).
205. Ross, 665 A.2d at 583.
206. Osigweh and Hutchinson, 28 Hum. Resource Mgmt. at 382 (cited in note 72).
207. See Redeker, Employee Discipline at 106 (cited in note 202) (discussing the potential
benefits of adopting a "fair system of progressive discipline").

1612

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1577

the associated costs, however, must be disfavored.208 The exchange of

a promise for an act is at the heart of contract law.209 Failure to enforce an employer's promise to demote only for good cause in return for
an employee's continued and enhanced activity contradicts this fandamental notion.
A brief survey of the terrain covered thus far is appropriate
before turning to the significance of the Scott decision's impact on the
employment at-will doctrine. Demotion is no different than other
terms and conditions of employment and, so long as wrongful
demotion is recognized, implied contract actions should be available
for any implied promise within the employment relationship. These
actions are available for any grievance during the employment
relationship unless some limiting principle controls. Disclaimers,
unenforceably vague promises, and a lack of ascertainable damages,
however, do not effectively limit the scope of implied contract actions
regarding terms and conditions of employment. Intrinsic limitations
to the Scott decision based on unilateral contract theory are similarly
non-limiting because wrongful demotion and other claims regarding
terms and conditions of employment meet the elements of a valid
unilateral contract.
Policy concerns regarding judicial scrutiny of day-to-day business decisions also provide no reason to limit implied contract actions
to wrongful discharge settings. Employers who provide benefits and
favorable conditions in return for enhanced productivity cannot refuse
to supply promised benefits and procedures after receiving enhanced
productivity. Without limiting principles, wrongful demotion and
other actions concerning terms and conditions of employment can
arise from any portion of the employer-employee relationship governed by an implied promise. When every term and condition of employment, from discharge to coffee breaks, is subject to challenge, how
much at-will is left in the at-will doctrine?

208. Williams, 459 S.E.2d at 341. The Supreme Court has recognized this fact implicitly in
the Title VII realm. In Hishon, the Court found that a law firm had breached its implied promise
to make the plaintiff a partner, noting that, as a "matter of course," this promise was a key
inducement behind the plaintiffs acceptance of employment and, therefore, was deserving of
Title VII protection. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 74-75.
209. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981).
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V. ASSESSING EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL IN THE AFTERMATH OF
WRONGFUL DEMOTION

At one time, the at-will doctrine controlled all aspects of the
employment relationship: hiring, the terms and conditions of employment, and termination. Later, recognition of wrongful discharge
limited an employer's ability to terminate an employee. The vast
portion of the employer-employee relationship between hiring and
termination, however, remained completely subject to the employer's
discretion under the at-will doctrine. Scott was the first state supreme
court decision to allow an action for the breach of an implied contract
between hiring and termination. As demonstrated, though, once
courts cross the line from recognizing implied contracts regarding
termination to those regarding the terms and conditions of
employment, no further limiting principle exists. The primary
significance of the Scott decision, and the aspect that distinguishes it
from a wrongful discharge action, is the scope of the employer's
discretion restricted by implied contracts. Wrongful discharge law
creates liability for employers who promise job security but terminate
employees without cause. The Scott decision, however, creates
liability for breach of an implied promise regarding any phase of the
employment relationship, rather than just termination.
The large number of sources that can create implied contracts
regarding a term or condition of employment also distinguishes
wrongful demotion from wrongful discharge and further decreases
employer discretion. An employer's implied promise to terminate only
for good cause may arise from an employer's personnel policies, routine personnel practices, actions or communications assuring continued employment, industry practices, or the employee's length of service or promotions. 210 Clearly, an employer is significantly restricted 21 '

by these factors in its decision to terminate employees "for no cause, or
even a bad cause.212

Not only can these same factors likely imply

promises regarding a term or condition of employment,2 13 but examining the employer-employee relationship between hiring and termina-

210. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 327, 329.
211. See id. at 321 (discussing the "variety of limitations upon the employer's power of dis-

missal").
212. See Payne v. Railroad, 81 Tenn. 507, 517-18 (1884) (stating that an employer may
terminate an employee "for any cause, good or bad, or without cause"), overruled on other
grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134, 134 (1915).
213. Scott, 904 P.2d at 841.
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tion for implied promises created by this expansive list of factors will
lead to the discovery of numerous implied promises. For example,
before Scott, a supervisor's promise to transfer junior employees before
senior employees would not bind the employer because the promise
did not relate to job security. After Scott, however, an employer would
be required to transfer the junior employees first. Similarly, before
Scott, consistently demoting employees after providing at least one
written warning would not prohibit an employer from demoting an
employee without a warning. After Scott, the employer would have to
214
provide at least one written warning.
Thus, recognition of wrongful demotion subjects the entire
employment relationship to scrutiny for implied promises. Regardless
of the phase of the employer-employee relationship, any benefit or
employer practice may be part of an implied contract between the
employer and employee. The interstices that remain unfilled by some
sort of implied agreement will be few because of the extensive number
of ways in which an implied contract can be formed. Implied contracts
will likely exist for personnel decisions such as demotions, transfers,
promotions, bonuses, and other fringe benefits since past treatment of
similarly situated employees or a supervisor's oral assurances can
create enforceable contracts.
If the vast majority of working conditions and disciplinary
actions are subject to a standard other than at-will,215 the question
remains: What has become of the at-will doctrine? At the very least,
recognition of wrongful demotion indicates the continued erosion of
the at-will doctrine. Since the at-will doctrine only regulates those
portions of the employment relationship that are unaffected by an
implied contract, and the Scott decision expands the portion of the
employment relationship that the implied contract controls, then the
implied contract now governs most of the employer-employee
relationship. Consequently, the at-will rule governs very little of the
employment relationship in those jurisdictions following Scott.
Although the at-will doctrine will continue to exist, it will do so only in
the limited situations in which no implied contract governs the
conduct of the employer and employee.

214. See id. at 838-40 (concluding that an employer's course of conduct and adherence to
policies and procedures create an implied contractual obligation to continue the conduct and
procedures in the future).
215. These conditions and actions would include limitations placed on an employer's ability
to demote and, as long as the Scott action were to hold in tort, to make other adverse employment decisions in violation of public policy. See notes 45-46 for cases indicating that demotion
can violate public policy.
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Recognizing breach of implied contract actions for terms and
conditions of employment could have two possible results. First, if
employers become the subject of numerous and costly lawsuits, then
pressure for legislative reform may officially put an end to employment at-will. 216 Alternatively, courts may continue to recognize the atwill doctrine, but find that implied contracts have supplanted the atwill rule in every significant facet of the employment relationship.
Such judicial intervention into the employer-employee relationship,
however, is arguably contrary to congressional intent. In attempting
to provide substantive guarantees to all employees (as opposed to
providing protection from discriminatory behavior), Congress has
enacted legislation giving employees the right to organize and bargain
collectively,217 but it has not provided for judicial intervention through
new causes of action. 2 8 Moreover, judicial intervention creates an
ever-widening dichotomy between unionized and non-unionized
21 9
employee protections.
One state legislature, however, has taken a more vigorous
approach. Montana's Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act2 0
prohibits an employer from discharging an employee without good
cause and codifies the prohibition against dismissals in violation of
public policy or an employer's personnel policy.2 21 The Act does not,
however, cover wrongful demotion. 22 Arizona is the only other state to
have enacted similar legislation, but it is much less favorable to
employees than Montana's act.23 Arizona appears to have simply
codified the implied contract exception and recognized that employers
may not terminate an employee if they have guaranteed employment
in either an employee handbook or a similar document distributed to
the employee.224 Arizona's act signals a legislative acceptance of the

216. See notes 220-21 and accompanying text (discussing Montana's legislative abolition of
the at-will rule).
217. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) (giving employees the right to
form unions and bargain collectively).

218. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective BargainingSystem, 59 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 575, 622-24 (1992) (urging industrial self-government through federal collective
bargaining law).
219. Id. at 577.
220. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-901 et seq. (1995).
221. Id. § 39-2-904.
222. Clark, 927 P.2d at 998 (refusing to recognize wrongful demotion under Montana's
wrongful discharge statute).

223. Employment Protection Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1501 (West 1996).
224. Id. § 23-1501(2). The Arizona Act states:
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implied contract exception-an exception that theoretically should
encompass wrongful demotion.
Allowing states to pass legislation, rather than waiting for the
courts to chip away at the at-will doctrine, cause a great deal of
confusion regarding the state of employment law, and face charges of
excessive activism, may be the best approach because of legislation's
broad, immediate sweep. In the absence of federal legislation, such
actions by the states would also provide a "healthy experimentation"
with various approaches. 225 In fact, one commentator has suggested
that state remedies, including wrongful discharge, have been
expanded to replace the judicial erosion of federal collective
bargaining rights.226 If this suggestion is correct, legislative support of
collective bargaining is not undermined as clearly because state expansion of employment rights is countering judicial erosion of the
legislative protection of the National Labor Relations Act.
Considerable debate exists regarding which approach, employee organization, federal legislation, or state legislation, is better
suited to reform employment law to make it more palatable for both
employers and employees.22 7 Whether legislation or continued judicial
erosion of the at-will doctrine will resolve this debate is unclear.
Regardless, breach of implied contract actions, such as wrongful

The employment relationship is severable at the pleasure of either the employee or
employer unless both.., have signed a written contract to the contrary ....[This
contract may] be set forth in the employment handbook or manual or similar
document... if that document expresses the intent that it is a contract of
employment ....
Id.
225. Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust DischargeReform Heads Toward
Full Flower, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 56, 71 (1988). Professor St. Antoine suggests several approaches to
state legislation of wrongful discharge laws, including adoption of a "just cause" requirement for
all dismissals; exclusion of some classes of employees (such as unionized employees); and
adjudication of disputes, costs, remedies, and the scope of discipline. Id. at 71-81. Interestingly,
Professor St. Antoine urges that legislation should provide a remedy for wrongful demotion. Id.
at 76.
226. Van Wezel Stone, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 591-93 (cited in note 218).
227. 'Compare Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations:
Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects,51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1012, 1040
(1984) (arguing that employment law has moved "toward direct imposition of specific minimal
terms and standards where problems in the workplace have been perceived" and that employment law should move "away from [a] governmentally sheltered monopoly status for labor
unions") with Van Wezel Stone, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 636-38 (cited in note 218) (countering with
four reasons why collective bargaining is superior to the expansion of judicial remedies).
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demotion, spell either the legislative end of employment at-will or the
judicial relegation of the doctrine to the margins of American employment law.
Gregory Mark Munson*
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